Calvin L. Rampton, Governor of the State of Utah, and The State Of  Utah v. Haven J. Barlow, President of the Senate of the State of Utah and Lorin N. Pace, Speaker of the House Of Representatives of the State of Utah, Et Al.: Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1969 
Calvin L. Rampton, Governor of the State of Utah, and The State 
Of Utah v. Haven J. Barlow, President of the Senate of the State of 
Utah and Lorin N. Pace, Speaker of the House Of Representatives 
of the State of Utah, Et Al.: Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Sidney Baucom; Attorney for Appellant 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Rampton v. Barlow, No. 11725 (1969). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4840 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, Governor 
of the State of Utah, and 
the STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
HAVEN J. BARLOW, President of 
the Senate of the State of 
Utah and LORIN N. PACE, Speaker 
of the House of Representatives 
of the State of Utah, et al., 
Defendants and ResTJOndents. 





An Appeal from the Judgment of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge 
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
1407 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
REX J. HANSON 
MERLYN R. LYBBERT 
Hanson & Baldwin F I L E D 
Kearns Building . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 c,: ; '"") 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents -·- -
• ...11 •• , · ....... 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
OF CASE ----- - - - --- ------------- 1 
IN LO\VER COURT ____ --- ----------------------- - 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL_ - - -- -- --- -- ------- ------------- 2 
STATD1ENT OF FACTS_ - - ------ - ------- ------------ --------- 2 
ARGUMENT ------- --- - - -- ----------------------------------- 4 
POINT I 
SECTION 5(1) OF SENATE BILL 10 PASSED BY 
THE 38TH LEGISIATURE OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH WHICH VESTS POWER OF APPOINT-
MENT TO THE ST A TE BOARD OF HIGHER ED-
UCATION IN MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE 
VIOLATES ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10, CONSTI-
TUTION OF UTAH WHICH RESERVES SUCH 
POWER OF APPOINTMENT TO THE GOVERN-
OR OF THE ST A TE AND IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AND INVALID __ ------------------------- -------- -------- 4 
POINT II 
SECTION 5(1) OF SENATE BILL 10 PASSED BY 
THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH "WHICH VESTS POWER OF APPOINT-
MENT TO THE STATE BOARD OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN :VIEMBERS OF THE LEGISLA-
TURE VIOLA TES ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UT AH WHICH PRO-
VIDES FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS OF 
THE THREE DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERN-
i_\1ENT AND IS CONSEQUENTLY UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND INVALID. _______________________________________ 22 
POINT III 
SECTION 5(1) OF SENATE BILL 10 PASSED BY 
THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF THE ST A TE OF 
UTAH IN REQUIRING SENATE APPROVAL OF 
THE GOVERNOR'S APPOINTEES BUT NOT 
THOSE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENA TE 
AND SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE IS DISCRIMI-
NATORY AND VIOLATES ARTICLE I SECTION 
23, OF THE UT AH CONSTITUTION AND THE 
"EQUAL PROTECTION" CLAUSE OF AMEND-
MENT XIV_ OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES ------------------------------------------- ____________ 42 
CONCLUSION ______________ ---------------------------------- ____________________ 47 
APPENDIX A _____________________________________________________________ 50 
CASES CITED 
Ashmore n. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 211 S.C 
77, 44 S.E.2d 88, 173 A.LR. 397 ( 1947 l 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct 
691 (1962) ............................................ . 
Behnke v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 13 NJ. H. 
97 A.2d 647 (1953) ................................ .. 
Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville. 216 Ind. 399. 24 
N.E.2d 937 (1940) ........................ . 
Dunbar v. Cronin, 18 Ariz. 583, 164 P. 447 ( 1917 I.. 11, 
Duncan v. McAlister, 1 Utah 81 (1873) ............ 12. 13. l" 
Giss v. Jordan, 82 Ariz. 152, 309 P.2d 779 ( 1957) 3i 
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 
464 ( 1948 ) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . .. .. .. . .. . 4.\ 
Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State 
Legislature, 19 Utah 2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 
( 1967) .................................................................... 22, 40. i.\ 
In re Opinion of the Justices. 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 
807 ( 1939) ...................................... ................. J11 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass, 615, 21 N.E.2d 
551 ( 1939) .................................................. ... ..... 2' 1 
Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company. 12 Utah 2d 357. 
+r 366 P.2d 974 ( 1961) ......................................... . 
Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1 
( 1899) ............................................. ..... . .... .. .31. 31/ 
li Lee v. State, 13 Utah 2d 15, 367 P.2d 861 (1962) .... -·· -- ·· 
McCornick v. Pratt, 8 Utah 294, 30 P. 1091 (1892) .12. 13. ll1 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 71 L.Ed. 160, 47 
S. Ct. 21 (1926) ........................................ . 2b 
People ex rel. Dickson v. Clayton, 4 Utah 421, 11 P. 
206 (1886) .......................................... . 12. lb 
l. '
,,! Nz.clzol1· z· 7'.frKec .. 68 N.C. 429 (1873) ...... 18, 19 
[Jcop 1: e1 < • • · 
FioevSaltLakcCity,20lJtah2d266,437P.2d 195 (1968). 44 
Spartanburg County u .. Willer, 135 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 
673 (19241. -- -- -- - - -- . - -- -- - - -- - -- ---·-- ---- 36 
Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 119 Utah 
104. 225 P.2d 18 (1950) ---- - -- --· --- - - ---- -----------· ·------· 22 
Springer i; of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 
189. 12 L. Ed. 84::i, 48 S. Ct. 480 ( 1928) __ -·-------------·----- 24 
State e.r inf. Hadley u. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, 67 S.W. 
592 (1902)..... ----------·· --· ----- 32 
State e.r rel. Ewart l'. Jones, 116 N.C. 570, 21 S.E. 787 
( 1895) - - - - -- - ·---------------·--·-------- 18 
State ex rel. Hammond i·. Maxfield, 103 Utah 1, 132 
P.2d 660 (1942). __ _ ________ ·-------·----------------·--------·--10, 19 
State ex rel. Hensley I•. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 105 N.W. 
1092 (1905) ---·- - - - - ------ ------------·----------- -------·-------· 34 
State ex rel. Shields u. Barker, 50 Utah 189, 167 P. 262 
( 191 7) --------------- ------ ---·- ---- ··-····-------------------·--·------------------- 9 
State ex rel. Swoop u. l'vfcchem, 58 N.M. 1, 265 P.2d 
336 (1954) -------------- -- - -·--·-···----·----·-··---------------20 
State e.r rel. Yancey u. Hyde, 121 Ind. 20, 22 N.E. 
644 ( 1889'1 ----------------------·--------------------·-----····------------------- 32 
State 1•. State Office Building Commission, 185 Kan. 563, 
345 P.2d 674· ( t 959) __ ···-----·--·-----···--------·--------------------··· 31 
State's Prison v. DaY. 124 N.C. 362, 32 S.E. 748 (1899) __ 18 
)tockmen u. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912) ................ 37 
Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 ( 1941) ........ 27, 40 
University of Utah z·. Hoard of E.raminers, 4 Utah 2d 
408. 295 P.2d 348 ( 1956) _______ --· --·· ----·----·------- ........ 22,39 
Wittler L. /Jawngartncr 180 Neb 44G 144 N vV 2d 
62 ( 1 %6 I • . ' . . ---· ·---- --- ----------------------------------------------- 33 
CONSTITUTION ARTICLES AND SECTIONS 
Utah Const. 
art. I, § 23 ....... . .................... . 
art. I, § 24 .......................... __ 
art. I, § 26 ......... ________________________ _ 





art. V, § L ........................ 17, 21, 23, 34. 36, 37, 38. 40. +; 
art. VI,§ 12 -----------···--············· ____ ... ____ .. . .. _ ... G, )' 
art. VI, § 13 ...... ______________ .......... . -------- -·-····- l1' 
art. VI, § 32 ________________________________ --------------- _____________ r 
art. VII, § 1 _________ _________________________ ___ __ ______ _ 9. j1 
art. VII, § 10 ......................... 4, 6. 7, 10, 11, 14, li, 18, 2i. 
24. 32, 34. 37, 38 .. 39. 40_.;; 
art. VII, § 11 _______________________________________________ ___ ____ _ 1-1 
art. VII, § 20 ..... ----------------------------------------- ___ _____ 7. 1 
art. VIII, § 3 ______________________________________________ ..... . 1:.1 
art. VIII, § 8 .................................. ____________________ .. __ _ __ 11_1 
art. VIII, § 10 ___________________________________________________ . 10. Su 
art. VIII, § 14. __ . ______ .. _________ ..... ______ ..... ______ .... ____ .. _ .. .10. s1 1 
art. IX, § 1 & 4 ...................... ___ . __ ..... .. . .. . 
art. XV, § 1 ....................................... ______ _ 
OTHER AUIBORITIES CITED 
42 AM. J UR., Public Officers, §94 at 952 ( 1942) ... 
16 C. J. S. Constitutional Law §23 at 93 (1956). ---- - ----
1 T. CooLEY, Constitutiond Limitations 215 (8th ed. 19271 :?I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN L. RAlVIPTON, Governor 
of the State of Utah, and 
the STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
HAYEN J. IlARLOvV, President of 
the Senate of the State of 
Utah and LORIN N. PACE, Speaker 
of the House of Representatives 
of the State of Utah, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
AND APPELLANTS 




This is an action brought by the State of Utah 
and its Governor for a declaratory judgment that 
Section 5 ( 1 > of Senate Bill 10 (Chapter 138, Laws 
of Utah, 1969), passed by the 38th Legislature of the 
1 
State of Utah, is unconstitutimrnl and invalict 1·1. 
as it purports to confer upon th(' Presiclrnt o!; 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repn·,e11 , 
tives power to appoint members to thr State' g11,1 
of Higher Education. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\\"ER COURT 
The District Court, after hearing argunH'11t 01 
considering memoranda submitted by tlw partit 
filed its men10randum decision and c>ntf'rrd a jud; 
ment declaring that said Sectio11 ) ( 1 i of Senate b11 
10 is constitutional and valid in all respects. an, 
denied all relief sought by plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment all' 
re1nan<l to the District Court with directions to entt 
a judgn1ent declaring Section 5 ( 1 >, Sc>ua te Bill \1'. 
unconstitutional and invalid insofar as it purpmi· 
to confer upon the President of the Senate and th 
Speaker of the House of Represc>ntativc>s pmwr J, 
appoint men1bers to the State Board of Higher hll 1 
cation and granting appropriate relief to plaintill· 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The 38th Legislature of the State of Utnh <'nilrtei' 
Senat(' Bill 10, portions of ·which lwcanw dfectiY' 
2 
111 
\lc1\ J ), Jl)li9, with the remaining provisions be-
: !llllillµ pffectiw· on July 1, 1969. The bill provides 
[ill· a Boa rd of l liglwr Education to control, 
i!laiiagt• And <;upervise all public institutions of higher 
('(:uca tio11 in the State> of Utah. Prior to enactment 
0 [ Senate Bill 10, the various colleges and universities 
thi·oughout the Stat<' were governed by boards of 
1 prrents or trustees whose n1en1bers-other than those Q 
ex officio-were appointed by the Governor 
1\·ith the consent of the Senate. Statutes providing 
for the creatio11 and functions of such boards of 
1·ei.:e11ts or trustees \YCH' repealed by the bill. 
Section S ( 1) of the bill provides: 
"'The state board of higher education shall 
consist of fifteen resident citizens of the 
state, nine of whon1 shall be appointed by the 
governor with consent of the senate. Three 
members of the board shall be appointed by 
the president of the senate and three mem-
bers by the speaker of the house of representa-
tives in the manner provided herein. Not 
more than eight members shall, at any time, 
he from one political party. In making ap-
pointmc>nts to the board, persons shall be 
selected from the state at large with due con-
sideration for geographical representation." 
After plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Dis-
trict Court, and before the matter could be set for 
3 
hearing on plaintiffs' application for a J)rel1'n1 
injunction, the effective date arriv<>d for that portir· 
of the bill providing for appoi11tn1ents to the boilr« 
Imerndiately thereafter, defendants, Unrlow 01111 
Pace, made appointments to the board. Subsequp111 
ly, plaintiffs moved for leave to amf'nd their con
1 
plaint to add as defendants the six members dPsig 
nated by the defendants. The motio11 was granthi 
and the added defendants appeared in the action. 
asserting the right to serve as members of the board 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 5C1) OF SENATE BILL 10 PASSEDB\ 
THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH 'VVHICH VESTS PO"''ER OF APPOINT 
MENT TO THE STATE BOARD OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN MEMBERS OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE VIOLATES ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10. 
CONSTITUTION OF UT AH, WHICH RESER\'£\ 
SUCH POWER OF APPOINTMENT TO TI-if 
GOVERNOR OF THE ST ATE AND IS UNCOK 
STITUTIONAL AND INVALID. 
The povver of the governor of the State of Utah 
to appoint state officers is found in Articlf' Vil, Set-
tion 10, Constitution of Utah, which provides: 
4 
The governor shall nmninate, and by and 
with the consent of the Senate, appoint all 
:-tate and district officers whose offices are 
rstablished by this constitution, or which 
may be created by law, and whose appoint-
ment or election is not otherwise provided 
for * * *" 
The principal point of contention between plain-
tiffs a11d defendants, in connection with the above 
provision is over the meaning of the words "whose 
appointment * * * is not otherwise provided for 
* * * ". Did the fran1ers of the constitution intend, 
as defendants claim, that the legislature could pro· 
\'icle for appointment of state officers by itself, its 
members or others whenever it by law created a new 
office or whenever the constitution is silent as to 
the matter of appointment? Or, was it their intention 
to provide, as plaintiffs contend, that the appointive 
power is vested in the governor, as chief executive 
officer of the state, except where the constitution 
provides for a different method of appointment? 
Much has already been said in this action about 
whether the words "provided for" constitute a pre-
positional phrase, and if so, whether the phrase 
relates to the noun "constitution" or to "by law"; 
vrhether or not the last clause is a dependent adjec-
tive clause; or whether or not the framers of the 
constitution were familiar with the importance of 
5 
the vvord "herein.'' Plaintiffs suggest tlidt )lir' 
analyses, while interesting and provouibw. 
little help in solving the issue at hand. Crrtaiiil, 
members of the constitutional convention wrre fc1mi 
iar vvith the word '·herein" a1Hl used it Plsewltc·re 
1
, 
the constitution. Obviously, tlw mcai1i11g o! :;cctiiJ, 
10 would be inuch clearer had tlw)· used it 
the \Yords ''except as othenvisc providcct'· liut il. 
not clear and the lower court so found I)\ smiJ1: 
' ' . 
'·I am not prepared to say that Article \'I{ Scct11.': 
10 of the Utah Constitutioll is plC1i1i. din·c! ,11 :, 
unc:mbiguous.·· 
Defendants have stated, had tlw fn111HTs intendt, 
the construction urged by pLiiu tiffs they 
simply have stated ·'except as otlienvisl' lmwide, 
herein.'' But it is more plausible to a rguc that lla:, 
they intended to give the legislature tlw duthori!Y +, 
provide for any or all future tlw1 
would have said "except as may be oth('rwise pt 
videcl by law" or ''except as shall otherwis" be p:l1 
vided." Instead, the present ve1·h '·is'' "''1' u<r 
It \Voulcl seem then that tlH'Y \\'('!'(' rcfrrri11g lo .ii 
present, that is the time when tlw coJ1stitutio11 '',I· 
being drafted and consequently frlt no need to <1d 1'1 
the word "herein." 
This construction is supported by the foct thc1t il!1 
fran1ers of the constitution, in those i11sto11cr' 11 ' 
6 
1
,. liich they intendPd to coJJfer upon the legislature 
c • n 1· to supersedP provisions ill the original die po'" 'J · . . . 
-··t tI.CJ1l rx1Jresslv made such prov1s10ns subJect u ' J 
t .c.('Lln 11 t IJ1·es1-rii;lio11,. 1Jrovisim1 7 or fixing "by to :,l!r);l l ' · '-
]d\\ .'' For example, Article VII, Section 20, provides: 
.. The Governor, Secretary of Statf', _Auditor, 
Trf'asurer, A ttorucy-Geueral, Superintendent 
of Public -Instcucdon, and such other State 
e:rncl district officers as n1_ay be p:·ovidecl for 
ln· law, shall receive for their services 
n.10nthly a compensotion as fixed by law. 
* * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * *" 
1 emphasis ;-icldecl J. 
Additional examples of the framf'rs' adherence to the 
\Yorcls ""by low" \vhen rPf Prri11g to future action by 
tlie legidotu re are cit Pd in Append ix A belo"v. 
In fact, even Article VII, Section 10, itself demon-
strates that the framers distinguished references to 
future action by using the vvords ""by la\\·." The last 
sentence provides: 
·' * * * * * * * * * If the 
officf' of st>crctary of state state auditor state 
' ' ' treasurer, attorney general or superintendent 
of public instruction be vacated by death . . ' res1gnat1011 or otherwise, it shall be the duty 
of the governor to fill the same by appoint-
ment, and appointee shall hold his office 
7 
until his successor shall be elected and y 
1 
fied, as niay be by !au' provided.'· 1 emplui·a.i 
added). 011 ' 
Inas1nuch as Article VII, Sect ion 10, avoids 
language such as ""except as otherwise prO\ided b·. 
law," or ''as 1nay otherwise be pn'scribed by the legj, 
lature," or "as niay be fixed by law'' (or fails 1, 
use the future verb ''shall") it sec'ms evident that th 
language ''whose appointment * * * is not other 
wise provided for," was intended to mean "not other 
wise provided for in the constitution." 'Yards mer 
in a constitution must be presumed to have brP1 
carefully chosen so that each word 'vill have a mean-
ing or to have been measured in such a way as 11 
convey certain and definite meaning with littlr 
as possible left to implication. Behnke v. ,\'cic Jer.1:·1 
Highwa)- .1utlzority, 13 N.J. 97 A.2d G-t7 <1955'. 
Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsz·ille, 21() Ind. 399. 
N .E.2d 93 7 (1940). Further, each provision 5houl1l 
be construed so as to hannonizc with all others wit1 
a view towards giving effect to each and every prn 
vision insofar as it can be consistent with rnnstrw 
tion of the instrument as a whole. 1(j CJ .S. (0111: 1 
tutional Law §23 at 93 (19:5()). 
Under the construction argued for by defrnda!lt,. 
the legislature could just as logically take the po.;iti01 ' 
that it could otherwise provide for the appoi11tnwn: 
8 
.. ·c 'J ., whose offices arc established by the consti-
ut u11 H LI s • 
· . ,--c,1· 1 a· those which mav be created by law. tutIOll J::- \ ·' . . . • • 
l'lrnt the term '·by law" rders to futu1·c action of 
the legislature was csta hlished in Stale e.r rel. Shields 
1
_ Bari;er, )()Utah 11-1(). 1(,/ P. 2()'.2 l1'117>, which 
.;aid: 
.. \\lwt is meant by the expression ·as may be 
esta blishecl by lavv' in the constitutional pro-
vision we have quot('d> To our minds the 
expression admits of but one n1eaning, and 
that is, iL in the judgment of the Legislature, 
it hcrnmes 1lf'ressarv to establish courts in 
ildthtion Lo thosP P1{umeratecl in the consti-
tutional provision, then the Legislature may, 
by lav\· duly passed, create such other courts 
inferior to the Supre1ne Court as in the judg-
ment of that lJocly nwy be necessary. To be 
"established by law' nwans just what it says, 
namely, by a law duly passed by the law 
maki11g povver of this state. * * *" 
Plaintiffs' suggested construction is reasonable, 
inasmuch as the constitution does "otherwise provide 
for'' the appointment or election of smne state and 
district officers. For e>,:mnple, Article VI, Section 12, 
permits each house of the legislature to choose its 
own officers and employees; Article VI, Section 13, 
permits the legislature to fi11 vacancies in either 
house "in such manner as nrny be provided by law." 
.\rt idr VII, Section 1, provides for election of the 
executive offin'rs of the state; Article VII_ Section 11, 
q 
provides for an election to fill a vacaHcy i11 the offii 
of governor; Article VIII, Section 3, proyides for tii. 
selection of judges; Article' VIII, SC'ction H, implirdl· 
provides for the election of justices of the peaci 
Article VIII, Section 10, provides for election 1,, 
county attorneys and appointment of attorneys pt· 
tempore; Article YIII, Section 1 +, provides for "I' 
pointn1ent of clerks and reporters; Article IX. Sh 
tions 1-4, provides for election of congr<'ssjmrnl repr. 
sentatives. 
The extent of the governor·s powers to appoin 
state and district officers, under Article YII, Secti111 
1 O, is one that does not appear to have been clecicle1 
by this court. Such decision was not made in Sta/, 
ex rel. Hammond v. litaxfield, 103 Utah 1. ll: 
P.2d 660 ( 1942), so heavily reliPd upon clefr111I 
ants in the lower court. 
In that case the 1941 legislature had crratrd 1 
new body known as the Engineering an 11 
amended an earlier statute relating to the State Ruct1' 
Commission, thereby providing for the tcrrninatio11 
of tenure in office of the members of the St<.ite Hoai' 
Commission. The act provided that members of th1 
Engineering Commission would serve as 111 
the State Road Commission. ThC' previous!>' ap 
pointed members of the State Road 
10 
·l t cl l!UO \\'a ff all to action against persons i;niug 1 ' 
· it •d to the Fngineeri11g Commission to deter-appo11 c -
· e thei· 1• ritrht to hoJd office as mernbers, ex officio, !lllll b 
nf the State Road Commission. The court held that 
thr of the legislature to tenninate the in-
cumbency of persons appointed to a state office for 
a fixed term d<:>pe11ded upon the purpose for which 
tt'rrnination \Vas effective. Inasmuch as the legis-
lature could create an office it could abolish it but, 
it ::;aid, this must be a genuine abolition a11d not some-
1hing done under pretense. If it abolished an office 
and put another in its place, with substantially the 
duties, it would be a device to unseat the in-
cumbent and beyond the pm\er of the legislature. 
The court stated (and this is the language relied 
upon by defendants): 
.. The courts are confronted vvith the principle 
that the power to create an office being in 
the legislature, ordinarily the power to 
abolish it must also reside there. At one and 
the same time the courts are confronted with 
another principle that the pmYer to fill an 
?ffice, at least if not otherwise provided for 
m the act creating the office, is executive and 
under a constitutional provision such as Art. 
VII, Sec. 10, of our Constitution, absent at 
least any contrary expression of the legisla-
such power lies with the governor. This 
bemg case the legislature has no power 
summarily to remove the incumbent." 
1 1 
The language generally recognizes that thi 
power of appointment is an executive one belonginl 
to the governor. The statement "at least if not other. 
wise proivded for in the act creating the office" 
1
, 
not even dicta. It was not necessary to the decision n! 
the case, and merely shows that the court vvas 1101 
considering the question involved in the present 
but was leaving it undecided. This is evident by u(
1 
of the words "at least" twice in the same sentence. 
A detailed analysis of the case actually shows that it 
supports the position of the plaintiffs rather than th, 
defendants. Additionally, the court pointed out thP 
necessity of maintaining the separation of power· 
doctrine under the Utah Constitution, and said: 
"On no other basis can the various concepL 
of legislative power under constitutional pro 
visions such as ours be reconciled or fitte1l 
together with the power given the executiw.· 
The only other cases which appear to touch o:' 
the question are McCornick v. Pratt, 8 Utah 29-k J1 1 
P. 1091 (1892), Duncan v. McAlister, 1 Utah K1 
( 1873) and People ex rel. Dickson v. Clayton, 4 Ulal 
421, 11 P. 206 ( 1886). The l\1cCornick case involve11 
a construction of the Organic Act of the Utah Trni 
tory which provided: 
"* * * The Governor shall nominate, anrl. bi 
and with the advice and consent of thr 
12 
!:ltivr _a]l. o!f,i,cers not herein 
othenv1se provided for, 
.\her noting that members of the board of trustees 
!. ·l c .1,,···icultural college were ''officers" within the () l l ( b' 
( . 111·11 cr of tlle Organic Act, the court held that a l ll '.Cl b ; 
wliicl1 designated persons to serve as trustees 
\\(\:, invalid, but that the provisions establishing the 
!:oard to be appointed by the governor and the legis-
council vvere valid. The court also said: 
·'• * the legislature has authority to create 
a board of construction for the college, but 
has no authority to appoint the members of 
the board, if they are 'officers,' within the 
meaning of the organic act." 
Cases reaching a similar result were Duncan v . 
.l!c.1/ister, supra, and People v. Clayton, supra, both 
ol which recognized the right of the general assembly 
tu create an office but not to fill it. Those cases, with 
llcCornick v. Pratt, supra, would appear to be con-
trolling on the issues presented in the instant case 
t\cPpt for the fact that the Organic Act then in force 
rlid use the word ''herein" in describing the appoint-
ing powers of the governor. 
In their argument before the lower court defend-
ants took differing positions with respect to use of the 
''Ord "'hereiH" in describing the appointing powers 
of the governor. They argued on the one hand that 
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the omission of the word from Article \'II s". 1. • ' Cl [()j• 
1 O, rnust have been intentional and that thr le"i· 
t 
lature, therefore, 1nay provide by law for the appni 111 
n1ent of officers. They argued, also, that Lhe p11, 
vision was probably copied after the constitution 11 
Colorado-or some other state-which seem, 1r1 1.•r 
inconsistent with the intentional omission. 
Plaintiffs are inclined to agree with defel!dant· 
second argument, that the provision was copied afte1 
that of a sister state and therefore omission of t]1, 
word '"herein" has no particular significance in inter 
pretation of the section. This finds support in tiJ, 
reports of the proceedings of the Utah Constitutim1,, 
Convention where there is i10 suggestion that elirn1 
nation of the Y\'ord .. herei11" y,·as even co11sidPred b.' 
the body. The absence of arguinent about or me11tir11 1 
of elimination of ''herein" would seem to irnlicali 
that the fran1ers of the constitution, adopting thl' 
wording of similar constitutional provisions iu other 
states, did not believe they were changing C'stablished 
law. This is particularly so in light of the fact 
the Pratt, 111cAlister and Clayton ca-;ps \\l'l'l' 11111 
decided on the basis of the "·ord '"herein." 
But even if we were to concede that ol 
the word "herein" was deliberate, the omission ol 
the word gives scant support to a contention thal thl' 
14 
. . . of tJ·1e c·onstitutio11 intended to confer upon i1i!!llCl · • ' 
f lna1"sfature authority to make appointments. t 1e 'b, , 
Jn light of the territorial and constitutional 
I ·storv of Utah it would be logical to suppose that 1L . ' 
the co.nvention elimi1rnted the word "herein" because 
it was il\\·are of provisions in existing territorial 
,,tcitutes and the E1iauLing Act affecting the election 
oi" appointment of the state officers. In Section 19 of 
the Enabling Act (28 Stat. 107.1, for instance, the 
following is found: 
.. * * * *the State govt>rnment formed in pur-
suance of said constitution, as provided by the 
constitutional convention, shall proceed to 
exercise all of the functions of state officers; 
and all laws in force made by said Territory 
at the time of its achnission into the union 
shall be in force in said State, except as modi-
fied or changed by this Act or by the consti-
tution of the State; and the laws of the United 
States shall have the same force and effect 
vvithin the said State as elsewhere within 
the United States." 
This language strongly suggests that the fran1ers 
of the constitution understood that there might be in 
existence extra-constitutional provisions relating to 
the appointment or election of certain state officers 
and that a general provision in the constitution 
\\"Ould he necessary to achieve continuity and avoid 
gaps or lapses in the method of appointment and the 
tenure of officers. 
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As previously conceded, it is reasonable t< 
. .J 'Lil 
pose that the framers of the constitution knew thi 
meaning of the word "herein.'' It is also reasonabi, 
to suppose that they knew the difference Letwee, 
present and future tenses. If the defendants' coii 
struction is correct, there is no reason why the leg1, 
lature could not also "provide for" its own appoin; 
ment of all "officers whose offices are establish, 
by this constitution." 
Plaintiffs' argument about the significance 1, 
the omission of "herein" is supported by the tern 
torial Pratt, lVlcAlister, and Clayton cases, whicl1 
were not decided on the basis of the word "herein 
In People v. Clayton, supra, for example. the 
issue was decided in the following language quotini 
from an earlier Idaho case: 
"All the powers intrusted to government in 
the territories as well as the states are clivirle1I 
into three departments: the executive. thr 
legislative and the judicial. It is wisely pr0· 
vided that the functions appropriate to cacJ: 
of these branches of the government shall b1' 
vested in a separate body of public servai1\i, 
and it is apparent that the perfection oi tlli 
system requires that the lines which separat1 
and divide these departments shall be clenrl1 
defined and closely followed. It is also true. 
as a general proposition, that the powers con· 
fided by the fundamental law to one of 
departments cannot be exercised hy 
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.. \ml where, as in this case, the orga11:ic law 
·ovHles that the governor, by and with the pl . 1 . 1 . ·1 , dvice and consent of the eg1s at1ve counc1 
:hall appoint the territorial officers, we do 
not think the authority can be delegated to 
another body, and the governor thus divested 
of his prerogative. If this can be done and 
sanclionecl in one instance, it n1ay be in 
othe1s, and by this method, or in the exercise 
of the two-third legislative rule over the gov-
ernor's veto, the executive may be deprived 
of the appointing power vvhich congress has 
wisely confided to the executive branch of 
the Lerritorial government." 
In view of this strong language, it is difficult 
to see hovv the framers, if they wanted to alter exec-
utiYe powers, could safely feel that they vvere doing 
so merely by omission of the word "herein." 
The fact that the word "herein" is used in 
Article V, Section 1, is of no significance in arriving 
at a determination that the word was intentionally 
omitted from Article VII, Section 10. Without the 
use of the word such as "herein" or "in this constitu-
tion" the last clause in Article V, Section 1, would 
have no logical meaning. 
A number of cases support plaintiff's position. 
Many of these deal with the problen1 on the broader 
basis of the separation of powers doctrine, and will 
generally be discussed under Point II belmv. Several 
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cases have, however, considered the meanino- 01· I:' P' 
visions similar to Utah's Article \'II, Sert ioH 1 o. L 
example, North Carolina's constitution provided: 
" ·The Governor shall nominate, ancl • •. 
appoint all officers whose offices are estcil 
lished by this Constitution, or, which shall i· 
created by law, and vvhose appointments ,11 . 
not othervvise provided for, and no such oil 
cer shall be appointed or elected by the Ge
1
, 
eral Assembly.' " N.C. CoNsT. art. III § 11 
(1868), quoted in, People ex rd. Nicho/.1 1 
l\JcKee, 68 N.C. 429, 433 ( 1873 l. 
In the early North Carolina case of People er rt! 
Nichols v. 111cKee, supra, the North Caroliua cou:i 
held that the words '·vvhose appointments are 1111, 
otherwise provided for" should be interpreted to mea1, 
appointn1ents not otherwise provided for in the co11 
stitution. After the decision in l\1cKee, the Norli1 
Carolina constitution was an1e11<led to eliminate th1 
phrases "or which shall be created by law" and ··alll! 
no such officer shall be appointed or elected by th1 
general assembly." Subsequent North Carolina ca>t" 
construed the amendment as having been made lo: 
the purpose of permitting the legislature to 
some appointments of officers. See for example. 
State's Prison v. Day, 124 N.C. 362, 32 S.E. 
( 1899) and State ex rel. Ewart v. Jones, 116 N.l 
570,21S.E.787 (1895). 
beC'n based upon particular legislative history, lull' 
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•. 1 . I ,. i·iiw u1w11 the construction of the Utah con-
11111l Jt8 r 
· t' "1 1Ji·ovision but People ex rel. Nichols v. 
-tltll ]UJl<• j ' ' 
l!c1'ff, supra, decided prior to the an1endn1ent does 
I , "i.icl in that case the court adopted the construc-iav e n 
tif'tl contended for by plaintiffs. 
The district court, in its n1e1norandum decision, 
invoked the principle that a state constitution is not 
ll gnnrl of power but operates solely as a limitation 
oti the legislature and an act thereof is valid when 
the constitution coutains no prohibition against it. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge Lhe doctrine but only the 
l<mer court's basic pre1nise-that in the present case 
there is no prohibition against the legislature making 
(',\ecutive appoint1nents. As stated by Justice Larson 
in his dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Hammond 
Y. Maxfield, supra: 
... * * So too the constitution is mandatory 
that the executive department, as depository 
of the executive power, shall exercise the 
executive functions of government and per-
form the duties of carrying into operation 
effect all acts passed by the legislature; 
it shall transact all executive business and see 
that the laws are faithfully executed. By this 
grant of power the constitution prohibits the 
exercise of these powers by the legislature or 
the judiciary. * * * 
"* * * I . 1 t is sometimes oosely said that all 
power not expressly prohibited is vested in 
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the legislature. This statement is loose , 
· 1 1 · Th 1 · l · ani nus eac ing. e eg1s atlve power the f 1: 1 k . 1 U  aw ma -u1g power, as noted ahove. i, 
the only power vested 111 the legislatur, 
\Vhile it has an exclusive monopoly in th
1 
field, it has no pO\l\'er beyond the ,limits d: 
constitutional law making. * * * 0 
"But the execution of the laws, carrying then: 
into effect, enforcing and seeing to it tho• 
the duties and obligations imposed by luw 
are observed and perforn1ed and not 
tive functions. They are in nature and bi 
the express tern1s of the constitution exhu 
tive functions. * * *" ( e1n phasis added 1. 
The same thought was expressed ill State c.r rd. 
Swoop v . . lteclzenz, 58 N.l\1. L '.265 P.2d 336 ( 19j-\. 
where the court was considering the vali(lity of an 
appointment of three district judges by reason of i 
statute to increase the number of judges. 
the right of legislative appointment the court quotrd 
42 Am. Jur., Public Officers, §94 at 932 C 19-t-2): 
"* * * vvhere the Constitution makes the act o[ 
appointment an executive one, it cnnnot l.x 
exercised by the legislature, nor can the lrg1s-
lature rob the executive of such power b1 
conferring it on an outside agency of its own 
choosing." 
The constitutional grant of the appointing 
power to the governor should be construed as depriY-
ing the legislature of that power, particularly with 
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, , , , 1 \\ Jwsc duti<'s Jie vvithin the ex-rcli'H'llC f I ( ' . . 
, , cleri·11·Lmeut ra tber than the leg1sla t1ve or rcutl'i e · c -
. I',' l Such IJri11ci1ik of construction is recog-
'UC H. W , ' 
J, l · 1 ]' Cool(')- Cunsliiutional Limitations 215 1nzec 111 · ' 
r.Sth ed. 1927): 
.. * * * such po\\ ers as n re s pccially conferred 
by the consti tutiou _upon governor: or 
upon auy other spec1f1ed office_r, the legi.sla-
caunot reqmre or authorize to be per-
formed hy any otlwr officer or authority; 
and from those duties vvhich the constitution 
requires of him he ca1111ot be excused by law. 
* * * ,, 
Defrmla11ts, uJ course, dispute this construction 
dllcl whether resort be hafl to rules of grammar, rules 
of statutory co1htitutional construction, or to the 
rnses and authorities, countervailing principles come 
mto play. It may well be that Article VII, Section 
10, considered in isolation, is unclear as found by 
the lower court. nut, if it is unclear, it cannot be 
a case "expressly directed or permitted" \Yhen con-
in conjunction with the distribution of powers 
dortri11c enunciated in Article Y Section 1 of the 
' ' Cut1stitution l 1 tllh, and it is a cardinal rule of 
constitutional constrnctiou that the instrurnent must 
he ronstrued in the light of ·what was intended by 
its framers. The mean in o intended by the framers h 
must hr ascertairn'd from the whole of the instru-
ment and in co11strni11g a particular section the court 
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may refer to any other section or provi'iion 111 ... 
certain object, purpose or intention. Uniucniir, 
Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408 · 1, . ' 
P. 2d 348 ( 1956); S'pence v. Utah State 11gricut
1111
, 
College, 119 Utah 104, 22·3 P. 2d 18 (1910! .. \sll .. 
cussed below, the courts fron1 numerous jurisrlictiri· 
have considered the question on this broader ]J8, 
and have invalidated similar legislation benmse, 
its conflict with the separation of powers doctriiH 
Defendants' contention that since the consti;,. 
tion is one of limitation rather than grant, the fa 
that the legislature is not specifically prohibited fro: 
making the appointments means they have authoni 
to do so, is repudiated in Hansen v. Legal Seni1.1 
Committee of the Utah State Legislature, 19 Lta1 
2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967). There is nothingi1 
the constitution vvhich specifically proscribed tl 1• 
legislature from appointing a legal advisor eitllf'1 
This court held such proscription was implied b)· tli 
provision making the attorney general the 
advisor to the officers of the state. 
POINT II 
SECTION 5 ( U OF SENATE BILL I' 
PASSED BY THE 38TH LEGISLATURE Ot 
THE ST A TE OF UT AH "\i\THICH YES,!' 
PO\VER OF APPOINTMENT TO THE Sl\ 11 
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llOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN lVIEM-
BERS OF THE LEGISLATURE VIOLATES 
ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF UTAH WHICH PROVIDES FOR 
THE SEPARATION OF PO\VERS OF THE 
THREE DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT 
.\ND IS CONSEQUENTLY UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AND INVALID. 
,\part from the quf'stion of the express povver of 
appoi11tment conferre<l upon the governor by the 
Utllh Constitution, there is a fundamental objection 
to defendants' exercise of the pmver to appoint mem-
bers of the board of higher education. 
A basic concept underlying the constitutions of 
the United States and the several states is that the 
legislative, executive, and judicial departments must 
remain separate, and that one shall not infringe 
upon or intrude into the powers or functions of 
another. In the Utah Constitution this philosophy 
b expressed forthrightly and mandatorily in Article 
V, Section 1: 
"The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, 
and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of power properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted." 
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Proper construction of the fon'going· reciti'ti· . · e, c111. 
sideration of Article YII, Section 10, which 
appointing power gcnPrally within tlw PXf'cuh 
departn1ent, and Article I, Section 2G, '' hidt mcil;, 
the provisions of the co11slitulio11 ··nwnclatory ill' 
prohibitory" unless cleclan'd by e>.:press \\nn\-; to 
otherv.· ise. 
The tTnited States Constitution doc:; nut cont0 
an express provision for tht> separation of Ii:• 
the funclan1ental co11cept has 1011g LeC'n recug11iz1, 
In Springer v. Government of I he Philippine lsla111i 
277 U.S. 189, 72 L. Eel. 8+5, S. Ct. 
the court considered the power of the g0\e111u1 ,, 
the Philippine Islands to appoint directors of cert0i· 
governmental corporations. The general proYisiu: 
of the Oi·ganic Act relied upon by the gon'rnor \\ii• 
''* * * that the supreme power shall he m\P 1 
in an executive officer, whose ufficictl tit' 
shall be 'The Governor General of tlw Plii 11 ' 
pine Islands.' " 
The Organic Act, however, gavC' to tJ1e 
the authority to increase the number or dbolish il'1 
of the executive departments, or make 
in the names and duties thereof as it may sec fit <ti'' 
provided for the appointrn<:>nt and 1TmoY<1l of 11 11 
heads of the executive depart1nents b)' thC' l;n,er1:11 
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., 1 111 discussiuo the powers of the legislature t1enr1c1 · · h 
. l 1e hrlncl and the goyernor un the other, the OH t 1e 01 ' 
United StCTtes Supreme Court sc-1icl: 
•·-+ * * Some of our st<1te co11stitutions expressly 
'}rovicle jn 011e form or anolhcr that the leg-
islative, exec u;ivc <-1rnl judicial powers of the 
governme1il sh;.dl be forever separate dis-
tinct froi:1 ead1 oth<:>r. Other const1tut10ns, 
including that ui the ULJited States, do not 
codtain such au express provision. But it is 
implicit in alt as a conclusion logically fol-
lo\'1 i11g from thP sepa ratioll of the several de-
partments. * * * And this separation and the 
consequent exclusive character of the powers 
conferred u po11 eac li of the three departments 
is basic and vital-not merely a rnattc1· of 
g0Yernn1ent 1nec hanisrn. * * * 
"lt may be stated then, as a general rule 
inherent in the Arnerican constitutional 
system, that, unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided or incidental to the powers conferred, 
the legislature cannot cxf'rcise either execu-
tive or judicial powPrs.; the executive cannot 
exercise either legislative or judicial power; 
* * * 
"lcgislatit. 1e pot'"'er, as distinguislwd from 
e:recuii1'c pozvl'r, is tlze authority to make 
lmcs, but not to enforce them or appoint the 
agcnl.s charged ll'itlz the du1_1- of such enforce-
mozt. The latter arc c.recutii'e functions." 
(emphasis added). 
The ruun noted that tlw officers jn question were 
charged\' jt11 lhe f''\'.C'nisc of l''\:PCUtiYC functions and 
tlit>1-cfur(, rnulr1 Jtul 1," <1ppoi11tccl hv the legislature, 
and that the enun1eration of the gover11or-generar 
appointive powers was not exclusive inasmuch all 
executive functions were vested directly in thf 





v. United Stales, 272 U.S. 32, 71 L. £rl 
160, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926), which involved the po\\tr 
of the President to rernovc executive officers who har: 
been appointed by aud with the advice and conse111 
of the senate, contains an extensive and informatiH 
review of the debates in the constitutional comen 
tion relating to the executive power of appointme111 
and removal, and to the separation of powers. Iii 
its review of the history of the constitutional con· 
vention, the court said (272 U.S. at 116): 
"* * * l\lr. Madison insisted that article 2 b1 
vesting the executive power in the President 
was intended to grant to him the power ol 
appointment and removal of executive offi· 
cers except as thereafter expressly provideu 
in that article. He pointed out that one oi 
the chief purposes of the convention was tu 
separate the legislative from the executiYe 
functions. He said: 
'If there is a principle in our Constitution. 
indeed in any free Constitution m?re 
sacred than another, it is that which 
separates the legislative, 
judicial powers. If there is any pomt. 111 
which the separation of the legislative 
26 
arid executive powers. to be ma.in-
taincd ·with great caut10n, it is that which 
relates to officers and offices.' 1 Annals 
of Congress, 581. . . . As Mr. Madison 
said in the First Congress: 
'The powers relative to offices partly 
legislative and partly The 
legislature creates the office, defines the 
powers, limiis its duration and annexes 
a compensation. This done, the legisla-
tive power ceases. They ought to have 
nothing to do Zl'ith designating the man 
to fill the office. That I conceive to be of 
an excculiTJe nature. Although it be qual-
ified in the constitution, I would not 
extend or strain that qualification beyond 
the limits precisely fixed for it. We ought 
alvvays to consider the Constitution with 
an eye to the principles upon which it 
was founded. this point of view, we 
shall readily conclude that if the legis-
lature determines the powers, the honors, 
and emolu1nents of an office, we should 
be insecure if they were to designate the 
officer also.'" (emphasis added). 
The court took the position that the power to ap-
point and remove executive subordinates is part of 
the "executive power," and that such power could 
not be legislativP or judicial power as they are under-
stood. 
In Tucker v. State, Q18 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 
(19+1 ), tlw legislature sought to erode the powers of 
the governor by placing a nurnber of boards .. , corn 
missions, and departments under the jurisdiction ul 
the secretary of state, state auditor, state 1 reasurer. 
and lieutenant governor, and giving separate adinin 
istrative departments the pmver to appoint mill 
remove their departmental officers. A separatr 
statute abolished the state board of education aud se: 
up a new board, four n1en1bers of which vvere to br 
appointed by the governor, and four by the lieuten 
ant governor. 
In a lengthy and well considered opinion the 
Supreme Court of Indiana held unconstitutional tl1e 
legislation taking the appointing power from the 
governor and giving it to other officers. Among 
other things the court quoted a pertinent Indiam 
decision: 
"* * * A departn1ent without the pmver to 
select those to whom it must intrust part of 
its essential duties cannot be independent. 
If it must accept as 'ministers and assistants,· 
as Lord Bacon calls them, persons selected for 
them by another department, then, it i.i 
dependent on the department which 
the selection. * * *" 
This court further pointed out: 
"The appellants say that if it had been in-
tended to confer the appointive power upon 
the Governor, a few appropriate words would 
have sufficed to do so. But Constitutions arr 
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concisely drawn and superfluity is avoided. 
lt was generally understood that the grant of 
executive power carried with it, among other 
things, the general power of appointment, 
* * *" 
The court rejected argunrnnts that a provision 
thaL officers whose appoint1nent is not otherwise pro-
vided for in the constitution should be chosen in the 
manner now or thereafter prescribed by law, con-
ferred upon the legislature the power to make 
appointments. Such construction was seen as creat-
ing inconsistencies in the constitution which could 
not be permitted. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has 
refused to let the legislature exercise appointing 
powers which properly belong to the executive de-
partment. In In re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 
615, 21 N.E.2d 551 (1939), the court held invalid 
a statutory provision permitting the legislature to 
participate in the choosing of four commissioners of 
representative districts. The court said: 
"The power (to provide for the naming and 
settling of all civil officers) which * * * is 
conferred upon the General Court is very 
broad * * * but its scope must be determined 
in the light of other constitutional provisions, 
including the provisions of art. 30 of the 
Declaration of Rights that 'the legislative 
department shall never exercise the execu-
tive * * * powers.' " 
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After quoting fron1 an earlier case that 'ti 
k 
power to appoint and the power to remove officer, 
are in their nature executive powers," the court 
added: 
''\Vithout implying that the General Cow, 
niay not by fixed law confer the power 0; 
the men1bers of boards of special 
cornnuss10ners upon the people or upon thi· 
General Court acting under its constitutional 
power to 'name and settle' * * * civil officen 
* * *-questions -vvhich are not presented b1 
the bill under consideration-it is enoucrh tu 
say that in our opinion the power of 
ing members of such boards is so far execu-
tive in nature that it cannot be conferred b1 
fixed law upon such purely legislative officeb 
as senators and representatives, acting in any 
manner other than that prescribed by the 
Constitution for action by the General Cowi 
without violating the provisions of art. 30 ol 
the Declaration of Rights. * * *" 
In another In re Opinion of the Justices, 301 
Mass. 605, 19 N .E.2d 807 (1939), the court helO 
that the president of the senate and speaker of the 
house of representatives did not have power to ap· 
point members of a commission, saying: 
"We are of the opinion, however, that the 
power of appointing such members canno! 
be conferred by law upon the President of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, whether or not such mem· 
hers are required to be chosen from among 
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the members of the Senate and of the House. 
'The power to appoint and the power to 
remove officers are in their nature executive 
powers.' ( citin_g of 
this general pnnople is not impaired by the 
fact that the Constitution explicitly empowers 
the GPneral Court 'to name and settle annual-
ly * * * all civil officers within the said 
con1n1onvvecdth,' * * * 
'· * * * vve are of the opinion that to confer 
upon such purely legislative officers the ex-
ecutive power of appointment of members of 
the commission or committee provided for 
by the bill and an amendment thereto, 
whether or not such members are required to 
be chosen frorn among members of the Gen-
eral Court, would be violative of said art. 30 
as authorizing the legislative department to 
exercise executive powers. See People v. 
Tromaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 43-45, 56-60, 168 
N.E. 817." 
In State v. State Office Building Commission, 185 
Kan. 563, 34:3 P.2d 674 (1959), the Supreme Court 
of Kansas had under consideration legislation which 
created the state office building commission and re-
quired the governor to appoint members of the legis-
lature to serve on the commission. This requirement 
was held to be invalid because in contravention of 
the Kansas Constitution, which prohibits any of the 
three branches of the government from exercising 
the povvers of another branch. The court noted that 
thr legislative power is the authority to make laws 
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but not to enforce thern and that the powers of thr 
commission in this case were executive powers. 
In State ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, 121 lud. 20 11 
' .. 
N.E. 644 (1889), the Supren1e Court of Indian, 
struck down legislation giving the legislature pom
1 
to appoint a director of the departn1ent of geolog:i 
and natural resources created by statute. This wa) 
done after the court held Article XV Section 1 ol 
the Indiana Constitution, similar to our Article VU 
Section 1 O, does not give the legislature the power 
to appoint but only to prescribe the manner of 
pointment. Referring to the constitutional provision 
for separation of powers, the court recognized that 
some offices, related to its functions, might be fillea 
by the legislature adding: 
"But the appointment to an office like the one 
involved here, where it is in no manner con-
nected with the discharge of legislative 
duties, we think involves the exercise of ex-
ecutive functions, and falls within the pro-
hibition * * * of the constitution." 
In State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn, 167 Mo 
680, 67 S.W. 592 (1902), the Supreme Courtol 
Missouri annulled legislation establishing a class of 
persons from whom the governor was required to 
make appointments for a particular position, holding 
that the legislation violated the separation of powen 
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provision of the state constitution. Referring to a 
constitutional provision that appointments of officers 
not otherwise directed were to be made in such 
manner as might be prescribed by law, the court 
said: 
''* * * That section expressly authorizes the 
general assembly, acting within its legislative 
rnpacity, to pass a law prescribing the man-
ner in which an appointment shall be made, 
but it does not authorize the general assembly 
to make the appointment itself, nor to 
authorize anyone unconnected with the 
goverment to do so. To provide by law the 
manner in which an appointment shall be 
made is one thing, to make the appointment 
is another; the one is in its nature the legis-
lative, the other is essentially executive. The 
constitution authorizes the legislature to do 
the one but not the other. * * * 
"The act of filling a public office by appoint-
ment is essentially an administrative or ex-
ecutive act, and, under the constitution, can 
be exercised only by an officer charged with 
the duty of executing the laws. There is, 
however, an exception to this rule which does 
not conflict with the meaning of article 3. 
Courts and the general assembly may appoint 
such officers or agencies, not otherwise ap-
pointed by law, as are necessary to the exer-
cise of their functions. * * *" 
In Hlittler v. Baumgartner, 180 Neb. 446, 144 
N.vY.2d 62 ( 1966), an act which unduly restricted 
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field frmn the governor might make D/J 
pmntments of directors of a grid system was held Ii: 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska to be un1011 .1. . 1t11 
tional because in violation of the separation 
11 
powers provision of the const i tu tiou. Quoting frun, 
an earlier case, State ex rel. Hensley v. Plasters · 
'11 
Neb. 652, 105 N.W. 1092 C1905J, the court said: 
''Again there can be no doubt that the Leu/, 
lature, after it has established an office, m\ 
the act of establishing it, may provide foi 
filling the office either by election by thr 
people or in a proper case by appointment Ir. 
some designated authority. The Legislature 
however, cannot itself fill the office. It can 
not elect or appoint the officer (citing case1 
and it seems to us to follow that it cannot b1 
direct legislation for that sole purpose caw 
an office to be held for the term, or am 
period of the term, by any particular indi 
vi dual * * *" 
The court recognized the povver of the legislatmr 
to prescribe reasonable qualifications for the perso!1 
to be appointed to an office but held that the legi) 
lature could not appoint officers whose offices arr 
created by law, either directly or indirectly. 
The extent to which legislative appointments l' 
prohibited by the provisions of Article V, Section I. 
and Article VII Section 10 of the Utah Constitutior' 
' ' has never been directly ruled upon by this court 
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.. ±· .. ,c we haYe been able to find. The question 
l] ])(} elf (D 
of ihe right to make appoiutnwnts was touched upon 
w the case of Lee v. S Late, 13 Utah 2d 15, 36 7 P .2d 
861 ( 1q62), which involved validity of enactment of 
l\ constitutional arnendn1ent granting temporary 
r-rnergenC) powers to the legislature. In discussing 
the provisions of the amenclmen t the court pointed 
om that it gave the kgislature power to provide 
temporary succession to the povvers and duties of 
public officers, remarking that it pertained "to the 
executive department uf our state government, its 
powers, duties, and qualifications of its officers." The 
court noted that one of the an1endments was to 
'make it possible for the legislature instead of the 
executive officer to provide for temporary succession 
for public offices where the incumbents have become 
unavailable." 
The amendments were held unconstitutional and 
different amendment was subsequently passed 
\Vhich implieclly recognizes that it is ordinarily the 
governor's prerogative to make appointments. See 
l 'r \lT CONST. art. VI § 32. 
The constitution of Arizona is less restrictive than 
Utah's and the Supreme Court of Arizona has held 
th0 t the legislature has quite extensive power with 
respect to appoi11trne11ts. Yet even this court, and 
others like it, recognize that there are some limits 
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upon such legislative power, and that the ai . · Jpou11 
ments made by it should somehow be related t 
1 0 lJe 
legislative function. In Dunbar v. Cronin 18 1 .· 
' .1111 
583, 164 P. 4.+7 (1917), the court upheld somelegb 
lative appointments and reviewed cases from otliPi 
states. The court said: 
''* * * A revievv of the cases bearing upon thi 
subject would see1n to indicate a come11sus o' 
opinion where the office is peculiarly ident\
1 
fied or associated vvith the appointing power. 
as where it has to do with the functions anr! 
duties of the appointive power, whether it br 
judicial, legislative, or executive, the appoi111 
ment properly belongs to that department.'' 
The limitations on the part of the legislature to 
both enact and assist in the execution of laws wa1 
recognized by the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
in Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 2\1 
S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88, 173 A.L.R. 397 C1947l, which 
involved appointments to an auditorium boar<l. The 
statute provided that two of the nlembers of the 
board would be the representative and senator from 
the county in which the district was located. In 
holding the statute to be unconstitutional the Su· 
preme Court of South Carolina relied upon a constl· 
tuutional provision essentially the san1e as Article Y, 
Section 1, of the Utah Constitution. See also Spartan· 
burg County v. Miller, 135 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 6/3 
( 1924). 
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\ · lP from the question of the power to appoint, , SIC 
a large number of cases have dealt with the gerenal 
propusition that legislative, executive, and 
functions must be separate. Among those are Kzmball 
v City of Grnntsuil!P, 19 Utah 368, 5 7 P. 1 (1899); 
Stockmen v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 2'4', 129 P. 220 ( 1912), 
in which au act establishing a legislative investigat-
ino- committee was held unconstitutional as a "clear 
b 
and rnnspicuous instance of an attempt by the gen-
eral assembly to confer executive power upon a col-
lection of its own members''; Giss v. Jordan, 82 Ariz. 
132, 309 P.2d 779 ( 195 7), invalidating a law pur-
porting to exempt per diem and mileage for legis-
lators from a provision requiring presentation of 
claims to the state auditor. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the foregoing 
decisions are necessarily based on constitutional pro-
visions identical to either Article V, Section 1, or 
Article VII, Section 10, of the Utah Constitution. Nor 
do they contend that the cases standing alone are 
dispositive of the issues presented in the present case. 
The decisions clo, however, under factual situations 
involving similar attempts to infringe upon the ex-
ecutive power of appointment, ( 1) illustrate the con-
text in which Article VII, Section 10 must be con-
sidered, and C:2) establish that the consensus of 
opinion in the United States is toward proscribing 
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executive appointment by persons otlwr than 
11 
department entrusted with executive functloi, 
Moreover, they portray the nature of the clifficultii 
that could transpire if excursions intu tlw execuiti 
reahn by the legislature are not prevented, aucl tlw. 
show that there are two distinct provisions of tli 
Utah Constitution which preclude defendants, n01 
low and Pace, as n1en1bers of the legislature. fr111 
rnaking executive appointments. 
The district court, in its n1e1noraudum decisioi. 
found that plaintiffs had not pointed to auy clear-(UI 
seci:ion of the constitution which prohibits the leg), 
lature from doing the acts of which plaintiffs con1 
plained. Plaintiffs submit that Article VII, Sectioi. 
10, is such a provision; standing alone, the sectioi. 
may not seem absolute, but when read in conjunctior 
with Article V, Section 1, there can be no doubt Om 
says the executive (the governor) shall make ap 
pointments to state office. The other says 
neither of the other departments shall exercise all\ 
powers properly belonging to the executive, excep1 
where expressly directed or permittted. There 1' 
nothing in the constitution expressly authorizing thP 
legislature to make such appointments, thus it j, 
prohibited from doing so, and as observed previoush 
the lower court did not interpret the A1iicle YI: 
language to be express. The only provision which 
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)1. 
1 .. , 5 tlw lf>gislature to appoint officers is Article ,1;1! JOI J,.(', · · -
\'I, Section 12, which provides: "Each house shall 




officers and employees.'' lVIoreover, the pro-
Jn!Jitioll 11 rrd not be clear-cut or express. It may be 
irnplircl. L'niuersit_r of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 
iupra. dnd /\imball v. ('it_1· of (;rantsl'ille, supra. 
The district judge apparently felt that what the 
lcgisl;iture hnd doIJe here was not too had since it 
appointed only six of the fifteen rnernbers, and the 
governor was permitted to appoint the other nine. 
He did not feel tlrnt it constituted an "alarming 
i11cursion" of the legislative departn1ent into the 
powers of the executive (although he was not so cer-
tt:iu i1bout iuroads recently made into the judicial 
department>. But the question cannot be resolved 
011 the Lasis that the legislature has made only a 
little e11croachment. If the court tells the legislature 
that it is all right for the1n to appoint six out of 
fifteen members, what is to prevent them from ap-
i11lin ting nine and the governor six, or to prevent 
tllem from appointing all of the n1embers and the 
g(Jvernor 11011eJ If they can appoint six, nine, or 
fifteen membPrs to the State Board of Higher Educa-
tion, by the same reasoning they can appoint all state 
officers. In tlrnt case, of course, Article VII, Section 
HJ, n-ould bP completPly e1nasculated. 
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If the defendants' construction of that pro\'· . 
bl1111 
is sanctioned, the legislature could ··othenvise prr 
vide for" appoint1nents to all state ancl district office. 
by persons other than the governor. lf such · " pr, 
cedent were established what \Voulcl a ho1:111 
legislature from doing exactly what tht• Indirin, 
legislature did in Tucker v. State, The i1 11 
trict judge's impression of that case, thot thr leg;,. 
lature sought to abohslz the powei·s of the gowrnui. 
is entirely correct. Should this court adopt the n111 
struction contended for by defendants, hm\ cuulri 
it distinguish from a situntion where the legislatu11 
ah(ilished all appoint1nents of the governor if 1• 
should try to do so in the future? Plaintiffs submu 
that it could not logically do so. But if it should nm. 
Article V, Section 1 ·would be down the drain 
with Article VII, Section 10. 
A recognition of this fact ·was 1nade in 
v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State Leg11 
lature, supra. This court, in halting a legislatiYr 
excursion into the area of legal services stated: 
"Always there are they who want to change 
our government for one reason or another 
If the legislature, by fiat, could create its mn 
legal advisor, then logic would say it coulc 
create 50 or more others for itself, each ol 
which, of course, would have to have se.cre 
taries and other personnel. * * * We behen 
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the framers of the constitution had 
·ntention in 1nind under our tn-part1te 
1 " system of government. 
Even if it should be conceded that the legislature 
some leeway in providing for the filling of 
infrrior administrative or executive offices by some 
rnrans other than the gubernatorial appointment, 
appoinlment may not be made by the legislature 
itself. To permit the legislature to appoint or desig-
nate certain of its members to appoint executive 
officers in their uncontrolled discretion, is a patent 
lhrcat to representative government. To whom can 
the people look for recourse in the event of poorly 
;ulvisc<l appointment? The people as a whole do not 
elect the president of the senate or speaker of the 
house. This cannot be a government wherein "all 
politirnl power is inherent in the people." 
The defendants' citation in the lower court of 
numerous acts wherein the legislature ostensibly 
'rnthorized appointment of state officers by persons 
tJthcr than the governor is without legal significance. 
For one thing, many of these acts provided for only 
nominations or recommendations to the governor 
ancl the governor ma<le the final appointment. In 
other cases, appointment of an ex officio type are 
made arnl generally the acts involved only counc;ils 
or hoards with advisory authority 011ly. In any event, 
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f'ven if the legislature did encroach UJlon P\, . 
( Clii11 1 
powers in the past it is not entith•d to do s 
() llrJI', 
This vvas in fact rccug11izf'd uy the cl istrict court 
111 
its memorandum derision. 
"It is contended 'that the fact. thr1t simi]u, 
bef'n and ucrnmp 
t1ve inchcates a practical co11structio11 uf tli 
constitution which affords sanction f(\i' tli. 
legislation * * * The rule of pral'rical 
struction is of no valuP \vlwn it is ploin 1Ji
0 
the practice has been in opP11 violation " 
the iustrunwnt \\·hich the court is cnlkr 
upon to construe.' '' 
POINT III 
SECTION 5(1) OF SENATE BILL 10 
THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE Of 
UTAH IN REQUIRING SENATE APPROVAL Of 
THE GOVERNOR'S APPOINTEES, BUT 
THOSE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SEN.\11 
AND SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE IS DISCRnt 
INA.TORY AND VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SEC 
TION 23, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. .\\fl 
THE "EQUAL PROTECTION" CLAUSE Of 
AMENDMENT XIV, OF THE CONSTITLTIU\ 
OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Not content with usurping executive funrtio111. 
the legislature, in drafting Section 5 ( 1) of the Bill. 
went even further. It provided that the nine appoint· 
ments to be made by the governor \Yotild be "iii 
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the couscnt of the senate, but required no consent 
by anyone as to the appoint1nents to be made by the 
prrsidcnt of the senate and the speaker of the house. 
Nu cumplc1int can be made concerning the require-
rnc;it for con'.;ent to the governor's appoint-
ment.::? since such consent is required in the consti-
fo1· execuliY{' appointments generally. How-
r>.ci·, 'lll allow the "legislative''' appointments to be 
nH'lc bY two jrnlivid11nls who CJ.re not answerable to 
the· senate, or indeed to anyone else, is discriminatory 
<rnd yiolates ,\rtirle 1, Section 2+, Utah Constitution, 
,, hich provides th0t "All lmYs of a general nature 
shail unifonn operation." 
Couple(l with the requiren1ents of selection with 
regard to geography, political affiliation, and senate 
cousenL the legislative povYer of appointment could 
well deprive the governor of effective use of the 
pmver to appoint "'his" nine nlembers of the board. 
ft cut tld result in partisanship, favoritism, and polit-
ical cronyism of tlw \Yo1·st sort-some of the things 
Llw \Hiteis of the constiLution sought to eliminate by 
providing for sc11atorial coufirrnation of executive 
appoiutmeats. This almw should result in the court 
ikiiig frurn the art provisions allowing appoint-
ment of mern lwrs of the boarcl b.Y the president of 
tlie sPnate and s1waker of tlw how;t'. 
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Article I, Section 2+, has frequentlv bee _ 
. . · II Cu11 
s1dered by this court and it has always held that di 
criminatory and arbitrary classifirntions c - annr,
1 
stand. There can be classification, awl tlwre ca 
1 < lJ )I 
differentiation, but there must be a reaso11"ble l 
' n 
for distinction. See e.g., Roe v. Salt Lake City, 
Utah 2d 266, +3 7 P. 2d 19:5 ( 1968); Justice v. Stand 
ard Gilsonite Compan;-, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2rl 
974 (1961); Gronlund v. Salt Lake Citr, 113 Ct<i! 
284, 194 P. 2d 46+ (1948). 
VVhat reasonable basis can there be for cxempti111 
the president's and speaker's appointments from thr· 
requirement of senate consent. It couldn't be thal 
they are more "representative of the people" than 
the governor. As pointed out above, the gowrnor 
represents the people of the entire state, but a mem 
her of the senate or house does not. Neither J) 
answerable to the people as a whole. 
No reasonable distinction can be based upon th(' 
fact that the president of the senate and the speaker 
of the house are themselves members of the 
lature. The speaker, of course, has nothing to do 
with the senate, and the president is just one membri 
of that body. It cannot be presumed that their ap-
pointments vvould be more acceptable per se to 
senate as a whole than would be the appointmenb 
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of llH' goverllor. Can a reasonable basis for the dis-
tinrUun be found in the fact that the speaker and the 
[ll·eside11t from the opposite political party than 
thcit of the governor? It is suggested that this ques-
tiPll ans\Yers itself; hesicles, it may not always be so. 
There is no reasonn ble basis for the exemption, the 
act is discriminatory and arbitrary and this court 
,:110ulcl not allow it to stand. 
A feature of the act making the exemption from 
senatorial co11finnatio11 inure intolerable is that pro-
viding that no more than eight men1bers shall at any 
one time be from one political party. Such a pro-
vision would not ordinarily be objectionable but inas-
much as the legislative appointments need no con-
firmation and the governor's do, there is nothing to 
prevent the president and the speaker from appoint-
ing "acceptable" n1embers of the opposite party thus 
forcing the governor to make practically all his 
appointments from his opposite party or at least from 
one party. Since his appointments must, under the 
act, be made '"'ith the consent of the senate, the presi-
dent and the speaker could effectively control the 
stilte hoard of higher education. 
Apart from "uniform operation," it is impossible 
to read the provisions of Section 5 ( 1), Senate Bill 10, 
without getting an uneasy feeling that fundamental 
principle has been ignored. 
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This feeling arises largely frmu recogniti 
1 . 
the president of the senate and speaker of the l 
· 
are not '"state officers" in the accepted sense· tl. 
' ld1 
the constitution refers to "presiding officers" of tlii 
legislative branches; and that the ··presiding officer)· 
are not chosen by the legislative representatives o: 
the people as a whole but by those identified \iitli 
that political party \Vith a majority of senators 
01 
representatives. 
Voters at large are not being represented equally 
The legislation in question (and other legislatio11 lih 
it. in vogue in the state) favors the 
of one group of voters over another, and gives onr 
political party an unequal voice in determining tht 
composition and character of an important publi( 
board. Although the problem is somewhat differeni 
from that of determining the composition of the leg· 
islature itself, Senate Bill 10 does deny "equal pru· 
tection" to all the voters of the state, and should be 
held unconstitutional on that ground. 
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663. 
82 S. Ct. 691 ( 1962), the Supreme Court of the United 
States said: 
"* * * A citizen's right to a vote .free ol 
arbitrary impairment by state act10n 
been judicially recognized as a right secured 
by the Constitution * * *" 
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CONCLUSION 
The provision of Section 5 ( 1 ) , Senate Bill 10, con-
ferring upon the senate president and house speaker 
the povver to appoint members of the state board of 
higher education, contravenes the state and federal 
constilutions and portends continuing excursions by 
th':' 1Pgislature into the executive and judicial 
domains. 
In the first place, the legislation infringes upon 
pmYers expressly conferred upon the governor by 
.\rtide VII, Section 10, Utah Constitution, to appoint 
those state and district officers (particularly those in 
the executive branch of the government) whose elec-
tion or appointment is not otherwise provided for in 
the constitution. 
In addition, the legislation violates a funda-
mental principle of constitutional government, an-
ouncecl in Article V, Section 1, of the Utah Constitu-
Lion which provides that the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches of the government shall forever 
remain separate ai1d distinct, and that no one of 
them shall perfonn the functions of the other. It 
violates Article I, Section 23, Utah Constitution, in 
that it is discriminatory and makes distinctions with-
out any reasonable basis. It is contrary to the "equal 
protection'' clause of Aniendment XIV, United States 
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Constitution, in that iL gra11ts to lllPllllH·rs of, · 
· cl 
political party an arbitrarily dPlPrmin"(I · · ' g-rea\· 
voice iu tlw govenrnwnt of our institutions of h' 1 . 1g;1 
le'anung. :\ncl. as suggestl'd by the d1·ci-.i011 l, • () I[• 
\Iassachusetb SuprPllll' Judicial Court in thf· ()fJl·, · 
I/Iii 
of tlzc Justices, citl'd supra, PH'n if tlw appointii 
power may constitutionally hP exPrcisPd by the le•n,. . 
lature it must bP done h.v legislativP actio11 
than uncontrullPd dPlPgation to t\Yo ol ih llHt 
lwrs. 
If the lPgislature is permittf'd tu arrogatf' to ih: 
th(' power to appoint rnemlwrs of tlw board , 
higher education, there is no n•asun to suppo'e. 
will not, in the future, f'XtPnd its pmwr into a1 
branches and kvels of tlw gon•n1mPnt, and mah, 
appoi11tnH•11ts of la\v clerks, court clerks, reporter· 
deputy state officers. and administrative 
to thf' governor. By exf'rcisf' of its appointing po\\t' 
it will bf' able to do with the classical 
tion of powers and participate fully in all aspe<t' 1 
state governn1ent. 
In l/ansen v. /,egal Scn·iccs Committl'C of th1 
Utah State Legislature, supra, this court halted a lef 
islative sally into the area of legal servicPs. Thi 
extent of litigation in this gPrwral arf'n illustrate, 
hO\v true are tlw words of this court, then 
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Jlf' they * • •" ThC' framers too could foresee "they" 
ancl by Articl<' I, Sectio11 27, intuitively provided: 
··Frequent recurrence to fundamental princi-
ples is essential to the security of individual 
rights and tlw perpetuity of free govern-
nicnt." 
Section 5 ( 1 > of S<>11ate Bill 10 must be declared 
unconstitutional and invalid. 
Rcspectf ully submitted, 
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM 
A ttorne:v for Plaintiffs 
APPENDIX A 
Article VI, Section 21, relating to removal 
officers; Article VII, Section 1, relating to duti. 
I 
officers; Article VII, Sections 13 , 14, and 15 relat· 
' Ii· 
to the composition of the board of examiners, boa: 
of insane asylum commissioners, and board of refon. 
school commissioners; Article VII, Sections 16, 1i,
1
• 
and 19, relating to the duties of the secretary of sta1, 
auditor and treasurer, attorney general and supcrii 
tendent of public instruction; Article VIII, Section i 
relating to establishment of inferior courts; ArticJ, 
VIII, Section 9, relating to appeals from decisions 11• 
justices courts; Article VIII, Section 1 O, relating 1 
duties of county attorneys and other attorneys pri, 
vided by the legislature; Article VIII, Section 14 
relating to duties of the supreme court clerk an, 
county clerks; Article VIII, Section 20, relating 11 
salaries of judges; Article IX, Section 2, relating ti 
ratios for legislative apportionment; Article XI, Ser 
tion 1, relating to subdivisions of the state; Artid1 
XVI, Section 2, providing for establishment, prescri[i 
tion of duties, and compensation of the board ol 
labor, conciliation and arbitration; Article XIX 
Section 2, relating to reformatory and penal insti· 
tutions and those for the benefit of the insane, blind. 
deaf and dumb; and Article XXIV, Section 8, relatillf 
to seals of courts. 
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